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Last July, just a scant two months before the September 11 terrorist attacks, Americans witnessed an attempt by the United Nations to curb small arms possession by civilians around the world via its "Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects." President Bush refused to cooperate with efforts to control civilian ownership of firearms in the U.S. and, in accordance with U.N. demands, he was roundly excoriated by many in and outside of U.N. circles.

It's no surprise that an organization comprised of nation-states would be more concerned with the stability of dictators than with civil liberties, especially the right of an individual to possess the tools for protection against criminals or a criminal government. And it's not difficult to decode the rhetoric camouflaging the U.N.'s attempt to guard against both possibilities:

"The proliferation of light weapons gives greatest cause for concern when they cease to be in the control of security forces and become the charge of sub-state actors and organizations. This is the point at which control is crucial."

To instill the requisite fear of firearms needed to camouflage its agenda of power acquisition, the U.N. has forged ahead with perpetuation of the "weapons effect" myth.

Whether called "weapons effect," the "instrumentality theory" or the "accessibility thesis" (the U.N.'s favorite), the premise is the same: Firearms not only increase the chance of causing serious injury but, by aggressive meanings attached to them through learned associations, guns provoke impulsive, violent responses. Blaming "the gun" is often easy to get away with because of the obvious correlation that exists between the one who was shot and the weapon that was used. The U.N. would have us believe it is the trigger that pulls the finger.

Snippets from U.N. propaganda bear this out unmistakably: ". . .political violence rapidly assumes violent shape because of the easy availability of lethal small arms...the more accessible the tools of violence the more likely they are to be used."

The origin of the "weapons effect" theory dates back to a 1967 lab experiment by psychologists Berkowitz and LePage. They hypothesized that the mere sight of a weapon could trigger aggression from an already angered person because of the learned association between violence and weapons. In their experiment, subjects were willing to administer a greater number of electric shocks to a partner when either a shotgun or a revolver was deliberately left lying in plain view.

But attempts by other researchers to replicate the findings met with very mixed results. Criminologists Hans Toch and Alan Lizotte noted, "...many studies have failed to replicate the Berkowitz and LePage findings, and some have even reported opposite findings." And, reviewing 21 weapons effect studies published in the literature, criminologist Gary Kleck observed: "...the more closely the experiments simulated real-word situations...the less likely they were to support the weapons hypothesis." Kleck concluded:

"...none of the studies provided any evidence directly supporting the idea that possessing a gun encourages physical aggression, or that the 'trigger pulls the finger'."

Criminologist James D. Wright summed it up this way: "...it is frequently argued by pro-control advocates that the mere presence of guns causes people to do nutty and violent things that they would otherwise never even consider...If there were much substance to this viewpoint...then one would expect the bodies to be piled three deep, and they are not."

If the weapons effect hypothesis were valid, we would find the Dodge City prediction come true: streets crimson with blood from the gunfire of armed non-criminal citizens where "shall-issue" laws have been enacted. The opposite has universally been found instead.

As Toch and Lizotte pointed out (they're weapons-effect proponents), "It is hard to explain that where firearms are most dense violent crime rates are lowest, and where guns are least dense violent crime rates are highest."

Yet, the U.N., while acknowledging that the "accessibility thesisÂ…is frequently contested," dismisses all damning evidence of the flawed hypothesis out of hand. Its only way around that evidence is to focus on the body of politically contaminated junk-science built up during the decade of the '90s.

For example, the U.N. cites scientifically discredited researchers such as Arthur Kellermann. Kellermann's fear-mongering conclusions about the alleged dangers of a gun in the home have been used to dissuade potential victims from making an informed decision about keeping a gun in the home for protection of self and family. That Kellermann didn't actually investigate the "accessibility thesis" is conveniently overlooked.

This propaganda campaign has served a singular purpose: the creation of a climate of irrational fear and loathing of guns and gun-owning neighbors, and the theft from individuals of their confidence to function rationally and effectively in times of stress and danger. The blatant use of outright lies is also part and parcel of the U.N.'s propaganda armamentarium. Its Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem attempts to implicate small arms proliferation as the root of all evil. Conspicuously inserted within one chapter is a sidebar highlighting the murders of three U.N. workers in East Timor in September, 2000. The final communiqué from American worker Carlos Caceres, sent to a colleague by e-mail, read:

"We are waiting for this enemy, we sit here like bait, unarmed..." Juxtaposed with accounts of the deaths of other U.N. workers, the inclusion of Caceres' death would lead the reader to believe that crazed civilians armed with guns were responsible for the murders. But the U.N. account omitted key facts reported in the international press: The killings were premeditated political murders sanctioned by the Indonesian military, and they were committed--not with firearms--but with machetes, knives and broken bottles.

In fact, U.N. officials were promised protection by the Indonesian military, but at the time of the murders, the military refused to assist. Had Caceres and his co-workers been armed, they might still be alive.

While the U.N. may be able to frighten its lower-echelon personnel with such horror stories, the lie that wielding a potentially deadly weapon will magically transform an otherwise peaceable person into a homicidal maniac is becoming an increasingly hard sell here in the U.S.

Consider this: On September 26, 2001, National Public Radio reported the following: "Gun dealers report sales of guns, ammunition and training classes are up...The increase in gun sales spans the country." Similar stories were making the rounds of newspapers across America and on prime time TV news.

The October 12 Las Vegas Sun profiled America's newest gun owners: "These aren't people wearing camouflage and face paint. There is an increase of female purchasers, increase in older age groups, lots of people wearing Dockers and polo shirts. They seem to be well-educated and well-meaning people."

The story continued, "Shop owners say the buyers understand that a gun won't defend them against every potential threat, but they want a measure of defense."

To the horror of the firearm-prohibitionists, Americans are making reasoned, practical choices, and shedding their fear of the "weapons effect" in droves. People who once would have recoiled in horror at the sight of a gun in their neighbor's hands now clamor to become part of this country's gun culture.

That includes, according to the September 27 issue of Capitol Hill's Roll Call, several unidentified anti-gun members of Congress, who have sought firearms training in the wake of the September 11 attacks, "in the hopes of protecting themselves if the need should arise."

And, to their utter surprise, they are learning that they really can trust themselves to use a gun for defense of self and family, and use one safely. The realization is finally sinking in that they may have no other choice: There are limits to government's ability to protect its citizens, especially in times of national disaster. In 2006, when the U.N. is scheduled to resume its initiative of total civilian disarmament (the U.N. has admitted that its July 2001 conference was only "a significant step forward," "a good start" and "a good beginning"), it may well find itself faced with a formidable enemy: America's newest gun owners.

Dr. Paul Gallant practices optometry in Wesley Hills, New York. Dr. Joanne Eisen practices dentistry in Old Bethpage, New York.